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Abstract This paper examines whether a bank exercises a monitoring role when a
banker is represented on a firm’s board. Bank monitoring reduces information
asymmetries, and hence lessens firm’s financial constraints—phenomenon fre-
quently measured by investment-cash flow sensitivity in the sample of all non-
financial companies listed during 1999–2002 on the Polish stock exchange. I find
that firms with a banker on the board rely more heavily on bank loans than on
internal capital in their investment activities. In contrast, firms with no banker on the
board finance to a larger extent their investment with internal capital than with
credit. However, firms with the bank-lender representation on the board are almost
as much financially constrained as firms without a bank-lender representative on the
board. Hence, the presence of bankers on boards is not associated with bank
monitoring. They rather promote their employer’s business. The findings show that
investment of firms with a banker on the board is less sensitive to cash flow than
investment of firms without bank representatives on the board. This result suggests
that bankers on the board provide financial expertise that help those firm to reduce
financial constraints.
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1 Introduction
When a transition process began in post-communist economies in Central and
Eastern Europe in the early 90s, the state had withdrawn from corporate governance
and a gap was revealed. Since then, corporate governance structures that are typical
of a market economy have been slowly emerging. Initially, banks were expected to
play a more important role as the banking sector was far more developed than
capital market. The latter was arising from scratch as well as institutions that
support it. After almost two decades since the transition started bank credit is far
more significant source of external corporate financing compared to capital market.
Banks as a significant provider of firm’s external capital want to obtain the
returns on their investments. The power of creditors comes from bankruptcy
proceedings when they take control over debtor and its assets that served as
collateral, if the firm is not capable to repay the loan. Collaterals and threat of
bankruptcy may be regarded as passive modes of bank monitoring. Banks may also
actively control indebted firms and their investment decisions through relationship
banking or sitting on the firm’s board. Additionally, in many countries, banks are
entitled to hold equity as well as debt of the firms they invest in, or alternatively
vote the equity of other investors. Hence, they have various possibilities to induce
debtor’s managers to use credit according to the terms of contract. Bank monitoring
enables banks to gather inside information about a firm that are not accessible to
other stakeholders. The closer relationship with their corporate clients banks
maintain, the more successful they are in reducing information asymmetries
between themselves and borrowers. By reducing information asymmetries banks are
able to lessen firm’s financial constraints.
Information asymmetries are central to the role of banks in corporate governance
(Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) as they hinder access to external financing
even in market equilibrium and hence lead to credit rationing. Then, firm investment
depends on availability of internal capital. Information asymmetries problem makes
the cost of external financing higher than internal one. In consequence, firm’s
managers always prefer less expensive internal capital to external one (Myers and
Majluf 1984). Diamond (1984) argues that close relationship with a bank-creditor is
capable of lessening information asymmetries, thus benefiting not only lender, but
also borrower through reducing both credit rationing and the cost of external
financing. Others indicate that close relationship with banks may generate lender’s
rent extraction from the borrower, because the latter is informationally captured by
the former and, hence, not necessarily bring about the previously envisaged
reduction in credit constraints for borrowers (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; Kracaw and
Zenner 1998). The empirical evidence is scarce and conflicting for Japan (Weinstein
and Yafeh 1998) and for Germany (Elsas and Krahnen 1998).
The aim of the study is to examine whether banks in Poland exercise monitoring
role, when a banker is represented on the firm’s board and hence firms are less
financially constrained in their investment decisions. Empirical literature confirms
that credit contract allows for an efficient monitoring of corporate debtors through
reducing information asymmetries. Firms that maintain a close bank relationship tend
to be less financially constrained in their business activities than firms without such
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ties. For example, Hoshi et al. (1991) find that large Japanese corporations that have
close financial ties to large banks, that serve as their primary source of external finance,
face lesser financial constraints than firms without such a relationship with banks.
Using data on the same group of firms for a later period of time, when liberalization of
financial markets in Japan occurred, McGuire (2003) shows that difference in financial
constraints between the two groups of firms is much smaller as access to other than
bank loans sources of external financing, in particular bonds becomes available. Van
Ees and Garretsen (1994) for Dutch large companies as well as Elston (1996) and
Harm (1996) reveal similar results for German large corporations. According to
Houston and James (2001) bank-dependent firms in the US are less financially
constrained in their investment activities than other firms that have credit relationship
with a number of banks or are using bond financing. The difference between those two
groups of firms is significant when firms make relatively small investment (\25 % of
their capital stock). The access to bank financing for US firms depends on the size of
planned investment, and hence the mode of corporate governance depends for the level
of investment outlays. That is a consequence of legal solutions binding in the US such
as equitable subordination and lender liability limit. Their findings suggest that the role
of banks in corporate control is determined very much by the institutional settings, in
particular regulatory regime.
Over the last 20 years of the transition from a centrally planned to a market
economy Poland reached a great progress in creating institutional conditions for
banks’ involvement in corporate control. However, there is little empirical evidence of
the bank monitoring. Most studies were conducted for developed countries. Few
papers are available on emerging markets, mostly Korea (Ferri et al. 2001; Bae et al.
2002; Kim et al. 2002). This study is the first attempt to address the issue for a transition
country. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two, preceded by
introduction, reviews why bankers are on the boards and whether their presence leads
to lessening firm’s financial constraints. In the third section the relevant institutional
environment with regard to bank-firm relation in Poland as well as methodology and
data are explained. Fourth section discusses empirical results and selectivity bias. In
the last one conclusions and future research agenda are presented.
2 Bankers on boards and firm’s financial constraints
Recent literature has suggested that the presence of bankers the board brings several
benefits for firms (Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi 2005; Dittmann
et al. 2009). First, bankers may provide financial or investment expertise, in
particular if a bank acquired specific knowledge through lending to many firms from
a certain industry (Mace 1971; Lorsch and MacIver 1989). Number of studies
provide empirical evidence (Ramirez 1995; Morck and Nakamura 1999; Byrd and
Mizruchi 2005; Ciamarra 2006; Dittmann et al. 2009).
Second, a close bank relationship, formalized through board representation, can
play a certification role, enabling firms to secure financing from other external
sources both creditors as well as equity holders (Fama 1985; Kracaw and Zenner
1998). Some studies show that firms with bankers on the board are more leveraged
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(Booth and Deli 1999), also due to the fact that banks sell more debts to firms where
they are represented (Dittmann et al. 2009).
Finally, bankers, while sitting on the debtor’s board, can act as monitors, by
lessening asymmetric information between the bank and the firm in order to
safeguard bank’s existing loans or their interest as an equity holder. Their presence
improves information flow between the bank and the firm, and hence economizes on
the cost of monitoring (Fama 1985) and enables better assessment of firm’s
creditworthiness (Kracaw and Zenner 1998; Kroszner and Strahan 2001), facilitat-
ing loans from represented bank. Williamson (1988) views bank monitoring,
formalized through board representation, as superior to loan covenants due to
having an access to borrower ‘s proprietary information and a position to discipline
management. The empirical evidence on bank monitoring through the presence of
bankers on the board are mixed and are identified for Japan (Kaplan and Minton
1994; Morck and Nakamura 1999), for Germany (Dittmann et al. 2009) as well as
for the United States (Gilson 1990; Byrd and Mizruchi 2005). In Japan bankers are
appointed to the board to monitor poorly performing firms, while this is not true for
American firms. In contrast to Japan and Germany, few bank lenders are represented
on the US boards (Kroszner and Strahan 2001). Bankers on the board do not monitor
lending relationship (Booth and Deli 1999).
Several studies use liquidity sensitivity of investment approach to find evidence
that bankers on the board lessen firm’s financial constraints (Van Ees and Garretsen
1994; Harm 1996). Having representation on the board, banks may be provided with
greater access to information about their clients’ investment opportunities and hence
the capital allocation process can be improved. The firm investment will rather
depend on the existence of new projects than on the availability of internal funds.
Unmonitored firms must align their investment plans to their liquidity. Therefore,
investment should be more sensitive to internal capital for firms without bankers on
the board than for firms with bank board representation. However, Fohlin (1998)
reports, using data on German firms for the period 1905–1913, that the link between
firm’s financial constraints and bank board representation is unstable.
According to the alternative view, bankers that represent a lender on the board may
generate conflict of interests. On one hand, they have incentives to safeguard the
interests of creditors, on the other hand as board’s member, they are expected to act in
the interests of shareholders or the firm. As a consequence, banks may be restrained
from firm’s monitoring activities unless the benefits can offset potential costs related to
the conflict of interest. The latter can be alleviated by country’s institutional
environment, in particular regulatory regime (Kroszner and Strahan 2001).
3 Institutional framework, methodology and data
3.1 Institutional framework
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief description of corporate governance
framework in a post-communist country based on an example of Poland. When the
transition started, there was an urgent need to established a strong mechanism of
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corporate governance, which could effectively replace entrenched managers and
actively restructured firms. Since capital market did not exist, banks, as the main
external capital provider even in pre-transition time, were expected to take the role
in corporate governance in Central and Eastern Europe (Baer and Gray 1996; Dittus
and Prowse 1995; Gray and Holle 1996).
The possibility to refuse to roll over credit gives banks a potentially powerful
control instrument over enterprises. However, they were not prepared to take the
lead. Inexperienced in applying market criteria to their lending decisions banks
continued to serve their corporate clients they had a relationship in pre-transition
period. The concept of creditworthiness was immensely difficult to implement given
that private enterprises had no proven track record, rapid systemic change was
already in place as well as there was lack of human resources skilled at assessing a
borrower’s financial situation. Moreover, an increase in credit cost caused that state
enterprises in a good standing ceased financing with bank loans. Only those that
were in the difficult financial situation tended to finance themselves with credit
(Gomulka 1993). That led to highly concentrated banks’ loan portfolios and
ultimately to a severe problem of bad debts.
Given the magnitude of bad debts in banking sector that reached 32 % of total
credit portfolio in Poland a fundamental bank and enterprise restructuring
program was indispensable (EBRD 1999). The main aim of the program was to
stabilize the commercial banking sector by resolving of the problem of non-
performing loans. It was related with two other goals. First, credit should go to
firms that are able to make payments on existing debts and have perspectives to
further develop. Second, banks should have incentives to monitor corporate
clients in order to assure themselves credit repayment and return on their
investment. The bank-led conciliation agreement that was a special tool available
only within the framework of the Bank and Enterprise Restructuring Program
enabled to impose on firms a hard budget constraint and build institutional
capacity for resolution of financial distress (Gray and Holle 1996). After the
restructuring program came to the end banks usually decided to strictly restrict
the amount of credit granted to corporate sector and hence their role in corporate
control diminished considerably (Pawłowicz 1994, 1995). Despite the acquired
expertise in the firm restructuring a close bank relationship, inherited from the
centrally planned economy, was loosened and ultimately severe firm’s financial
constraints have occurred (Konings et al. 2002). Larger information asymmetries
since cost of collecting information is higher in transition than in market
economies as well as difficulties with enforcing contracts discouraged banks from
monitoring firms.
The restructuring was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for bank to get
involved in monitoring firms. Privatization was the strongest guarantee that bank
decisions could not be subject to state influence. Nevertheless the process was slow
in most of the CEE countries, it enabled banks to transform their function from a
passive cashier to an active financial intermediary that were interested in debtor’s
control in order to get credit repaid. Privatization followed by increased competition
contributed to creating healthy commercial banking sector in the countries of CEE
after more than a decade of the transition process (EBRD 1999).
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Over the transition time the pace of institutional development increased and
necessary institutions were established aiming at improving the protection of the
rights of creditors. Among others, a great effort was made to reform insolvency and
collateral laws in order to restore credibility of bankruptcy threat in most of the CEE
countries. The results are mixed as the laws are very efficient in books, however still
the law enforcement requires improvement, in particular with regard to bankruptcy
proceedings. In Poland as of 2011, the recovery rate—calculated as amount of cents
on the dollar claimants recovered from an insolvent firm, was 31.3 %, possible to
reached on average within 3 years and the average cost of bankruptcy proceedings
was still above average figures for the OECD countries (Doing Business Report
2011). Given the discussions above, one might expect that banks will be interested
to actively safeguard their loans and monitor debtors actively through the board
representation alleviating firm’s financial constraints because they are concerned of
low effectiveness of bankruptcy threat or because increased competition in banking
sector.
3.2 Methodology
In this study the bank monitoring is examined by looking at the effect of bankers on
the board on firm’s financial constraints in a transition economy. Specifically, the
question is addressed whether firms with bankers on the board are less financially
constrained compared to those firms without bank presence on the board. Firm’s
financial constraints are measured by cash flow sensitivity of investment. The
approach was developed by Fazzari et al. (1988) and used later to analyzed bank-
firm relationships.
In this methodology firms are divided into subsamples based on the criteria,
which identify a priori those firms that face financial constraints. I use as a criterion
a presence of a banker on firm’s supervisory board as an indicator of a close bank
relationship. Typically, in the recent studies, duration of firm-bank relationship or a
number of creditors are perceived as evidence of close ties with banks (Houston and
James 2001; Ongena and Smith 2000).
In this paper, placement of bankers on the board is used as a proxy of close firm-
bank relationship for the two following reasons. First, institutional reforms in
banking sector in Poland caused breaking off credit relations between banks and
enterprises imposed upon them within monobank system in a centrally-planned
economy. At the beginning of transition a great number of new private banks have
begun to operate in Poland, and thus competition enormously increased and next
consolidation process in the banking sector commenced. As a consequence, firms
were constantly inclined to resign from existing bank relationship and encouraged to
look for new lenders.
Second, given severe information asymmetries typical of a transition economy
maintaining a close credit relationship may not be sufficient for banks to monitor
borrowers. With a banker on the board they can have more extensive knowledge
about debtor’s financial situation.
Having two subsamples: firms with at least one banker on the board and firms
without bank representatives on the board, I look at the cash flow-investment
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sensitivity. Strong and positive correlation between internally generated funds and
investment outlays indicates the capital market imperfection due to information
asymmetries. This creates preference for cheaper internal capital over more
expensive external capital. Firms that find it relatively more costly to rise external
financing will demonstrate a greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. When firms
with a banker on the board appear significantly less investment-cash flow sensitive
than firms without bank board representation, it is regarded as evidence that a close
bank relationship with creditors lowers the cost of external financing. It will be
consistent with the theory that bank monitoring formalized through sitting on firm’s
supervisory boards diminishes information asymmetries between lender and
borrower.
The equation looks like this:
Iit=Kiðt  1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1CFit=Kiðt  1Þ þ a2Qit þ a3Xit=Kiðt  1Þ þ eit:
where I denotes investment spending in fix assets of the ith firm in t time. Invest-
ment (I) is a dependent variable and is calculated as the first difference of gross
fixed assets expenditures. Fixed assets include land, property, plant, equipment and
patents.
There are two explanatory variables: Tobin Q (Q) and cash flow (CF). X controls
for other variables that can determine the size of investment expenditures. The first
explanatory variable represents future growth investment opportunities, which is
proxied by market-to-book ratio. The second variable, cash flow (CF), is measured
as net income plus non-cash costs (e.g. depreciation) minus non cash expenditure.
Hence, it is represented by cash flow from operating activities.
In a world with complete information investment could be financed by any
combination of internal and external capital (Modigliani and Miller 1958).
Investment expenditures would depend only on profitability of firm’s investment
opportunities. However, in the real world there is always some degree of
information asymmetries between a financier and a firm. It leads to a situation
when the cost of external capital is higher than internal one. This can significantly
reduce firm’s investment activities, which then are restricted by the amount of cash
flow generated internally.
Recent empirical work suggests that it is necessary to include on the right hand
side of the equation an interaction term (CF/Kt – 1*Neg) indicating negative cash
flow observations. Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, if firm’s cash flow is negative,
or 0 otherwise. Firms with negative cash flow drive investment down to its lowest
possible level, making it unable to respond to further reduction in cash flow
(Allayanis and Mozumdar 2004). This reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity
for these observations.
In the above equation I added several control variables (for details see appendix
Table 5) to determine the robustness of my results. They are defined as follows. I
include production to control for a potential accelerator effect. High level of
production may lead to increase capacity in the future, hence more fix assets
investment expenditures are necessary. I use revenue from sales (S) as the proxy for
production (Abel and Blanchard 1986).
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I also include a few variables that denotes sources of external capital: long-term
and short-term bank loans (respectively: LBL and SBL) as well as other long-term
and short-term liabilities (correspondingly OLL and OSL). Separating bank loans
from other liabilities aims to identify the impact of availability of credit on
investment activities. Severe credit rationing may lead to an increase of other
liabilities in financing fix assets investments. According to Weller (2001) positive
and significant relationship between different variables of external capital and
investment expenditures in a transition country indicates that firms operate under a
hard budget constraint.
To avoid heteroskedasticity all variables in the model are normalized by the stock
of fixed assets at the beginning of the period—K(t - 1). Further, I add to the
equation a dummy variable (BH) that shows the impact of bank’s equity holding on
firm’s investment. It equals 1, if there is at least one bank among firm’s
shareholders, 0 otherwise.
In order to control for possibilities to acquire external financing for investments
from large block shareholders I include a variable indicating concentration of firm
ownership structure (OC). It can take values from 1—the most concentrated firm
ownership structure to do 5—the lowest level of concentration. Finally, I add a
yearly dummies to weed out macro shocks.
3.3 Data
The analysis is based on unique hand-collected panel data set for all non-financial
companies that was continuously listed on the Polish stock exchange between 1999
and 2002. The timeframe, for which data was collected, enables to examine the
effect of bank monitoring on firm’s financial constraints during economic downturn
and upturn. The year 1999 represents economic boom as then GDP grew annually
by 4.1 %. This year together with the first quarter of the year 2000 was also
considered to be the most profitable period for the companies listed in Poland. Later
the economic growth significantly slowed down. And eventually, year 2001 brought
the worst rate of GDP growth in transition period equalled 1 %.
I restrict my sample to publicly traded companies for three interrelated reasons.
First, data on listed companies is widely disclosed and reliable. Second, these firms
are large and hence external financing and corporate governance is of great
importance for them. Third, the evidence suggests that firms in Poland operate under
severe credit rationing, while financing needs in a transition economy are high
(Weller 2001). However, it is likely that public companies have better access to
bank loans than other business entities as they are in better standing. However, firms
in Poland (Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski 2002) like companies in some developed
countries with very concentrated ownership (Pagano et al. 1998) as well as and in
most of emerging economies (Wang et al. 2002; Mayur and Kumar 2006) go public
for other reasons than to raise capital for investment.
At the beginning of the sample selection process 182 non-financial companies
were distinguished. At the end of the year 1999 there were 221 companies listed on
the Warsaw Stock Exchange. I exclude from this group 15 National Investment
Funds and 24 financial enterprises. Over time, 34 firms dropped from the sample for
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the following reasons: financial distress and ultimately bankruptcy (13), transactions
that took firms private as the results of strategic investor’s decision (17) and mergers
(4). Additional 6 firms were also excluded, because a complete set of the data
regarding composition of the supervisory boards was unavailable. Over all I possess
data on 568 firm-year. Since the sample contains firms with continuous data only,
there might be a selectivity bias in the sample. However, in terms of results there
should be no change in investment sensitivity to cash flow, because both good firms
(those that were taken private) and bad firms (those that went bankrupt) were
excluded from the sample.
Given the two-tier structure of board of directors in Poland, there are two ways,
in which a firm might have a bank representative on the supervisory board. First, a
bank’s management team member can sit on firm’s supervisory board. Second,
when the same individual is a member of both a bank and firm’s supervisory board.
The first case was much more common in my sample. 86 % of all bank’s
representatives on firm’s supervisory boards were bank managers.
Placement of a banker on firm’s supervisory board was common among listed
companies. 49 % of sample firms had at least one banker on the board during the
years 1999–2002. Most of the time firms reported about one bank representative on
the board (75 % of all observations). 21 % of all observations concern situation,
when a firm had two bankers on the board. Very rarely firms informed about three
bank representatives (4 % of all observations).
The largest banks in Poland, that were privatized after restructuring process at the
mid 90s., were the most active in developing relationship with their corporate clients
by having their representatives on firm’s board. 67 % of bankers on the board were
employees or were serving as supervisory board members of one of the six largest
banks in Poland during 1999–2002. Those banks were also the largest creditors of the
listed companies. Long-term loans granted to the sample firms by the six largest
banks added up to 64 % of all long-term credit delivered to all sample firms.
Having a bank representative on the board did not always indicate that firm was
financed with credit. Sometimes banks placed their delegates on firm’s supervisory
boards in spite of that they were neither its creditors nor its shareholders. 39 % of
sample firms had at least one representative of bank-creditor on the board at least
once during the years 1999–2002.
Table 1 shows some relevant statistics for the two sets of firms: with and without
bankers on the board (for more detailed summary statistics see appendix Table 6).
The subscript BT refers to firms that had a bank representative on their boards at
least once during 1999–2002. The subscript NBT stands for firms that did not have
at all bankers on the board during 1999–2002. The two types of firms differ
significantly taking into account the following variables: cash flow, long-term and
short-term bank loans, long-term other liabilities and size of firms (measured by
natural log from the total assets).
Similar results were obtained by comparing two different sets of firms: with and
without a bank-creditor representative on the board. The subscript BCT refers to
firms that had a bank-creditor representative on the boards at least once during
1999–2002, and the subscript NBCT stands for firms, where there were no bankers
from lending bank on the board during 1999–2002.
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The statistics may support the hypothesis that firms appreciate bank relationship
the most being in financial distress. The largest amount of bank loans went to firms
that had a banker on the board and informed about negative cash flow from
operating activities. This is a symptom of different state of financial distress such as:
temporary financial distress, severe financial distress or insolvency. Firms may
suffer from negative cash flow at the early stage of growth. This variant is not
applicable to my sample, as it comprises of listed companies that are considered to
be established firms. In my sample most of the firms were in temporal financial
distress since they report negative cash flow just once or twice during the years
1999–2002. Only 3 out of 77 firms informed about financial distress for three years
in a row (see appendix Table 7 for summary statistics).
4 Regression results
Table 2 reports regression results separately for the two sets of firms: with (BT) and
without a banker on the board (NBT). The first and third columns show the results
of the simple investment regression equation. Investment of firms with a banker on
Table 1 Summary statistics—comparing firms with bankers on the board (BT) and firms without
bankers on the board (NBT) as well as firms with bank-creditor representative on the board (BCT) and
firms, where bankers from lending banks are not sitting on the board (BNCT)
BT NBT Difference BCT BCT Difference
Mean I/K 0.216 0.226 0.165 0.260 0.198 0.948
Median I/K 0.077 0.098 0.857 0.079 0.088 0.093
Mean CF/K 0.148 0.250 3.159*** 0.144 0.234 2.684***
Median CF/K 0.133 0.184 3.513*** 0.124 0.175 3.477***
Mean Q 1.130 1.104 0.380 1.161 1.090 1.009
Median Q 0.970 0.931 1.687* 0.979 0.922 2.596***
Mean S/K 5.282 5.172 0.098 6.001 4.764 1.067
Median S/K 2.876 2.930 1.604 3.190 2.852 0.152
Mean KD/K 0.116 0.095 1.326 0.138 0.086 3.146***
Median KD/K 0.040 0.000 2.869*** 0.050 0.000 3.969***
Mean KK/K 0.353 0.274 1.853** 0.407 0.257 3.426***
Median KK/K 0.217 0.173 2.705*** 0.258 0.162 4.38***
Mean IZD/K 0.098 0.064 2.134** 0.112 0.061 3.145***
Median IZD/K 0.018 0.006 1.458 0.022 0.006 2.696***
Mean IZK/K 1.242 1.189 0.183 1.430 1.086 1.144
Median IZK/K 0.596 0.579 0.161 0.667 0.564 1.714*
Mean in size of total assets 12.205 11.850 3.123*** 12.319 11.846 4.05***
Median in size of total assets 11.903 11.791 2.023** 11.960 11.832 2.75***
* Coefficient significant at 10 % or better
** Coefficient significant at 5 % or better
*** Coefficient significant at 1 % or better
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the board was less sensitive to cash flow than investment of firms without bank
representatives on the board. The second and fourth columns present results from an
extended regression equation. The difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity
between the two sets of firms increased significantly. Again, internal capital was less
important source of financing for firms with a banker on the board than for firms
Table 2 Fixed effects regression relating investment to cash flow for firms with a banker on the board
(BT) and for firms without bankers on the board (NBT) as well as for firms with a bank-creditor
representative on the board (BCT) and for firms without bankers from lending bank on the board (NBCT)
BT NBT BCT NBCT
1 2 3 4 5 6
CF/Kt-1 0.65** 0.37** 0.707*** 0.533*** 0.5** 0.54***
Q 0.01 -0.01 0.413*** 0.461*** 0.00 0.45***
S/Kt-1 0.006 (-0.07)*** 0.033*** -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
CF/Kt-1*Neg (-1.47)** -0.15 (-1.8)*** (-1.2)*** -0.30 (-1.185)***
LBL/Kt-1 1.42*** 0.885*** 1.4*** 0.921***
SBL/Kt-1 1.47*** 0.302*** 1.518*** 0.314***
OLL/Kt-1 0.51*** -0.05 0.47** 0.15
OSL/Kt-1 0.18*** 0.1609*** 0.152** 0.163***
BH 0.02 0.182* 0.06 0.17
CO_1 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 0.16
CO_2 (-0.61)** 0.47 (-0.691)*** 0.39
CO_3 -0.07 0.28 -0.13 0.22
CO_4 -0.13 0.27 -0.08 0.20
CO_5 NA 0.49 NA 0.35
T2 (-0.358)*** (-0.28)*** 0.08 0.03 (-0.3)*** -0.02
T3 (-0.45)*** (-0.49)*** -0.01 -0.05 (-0.507)*** (-0.117)*
T4 (-0.477)*** (-0.44)*** -0.29 -0.01 (-0.487)*** -0.07
Constant 0.344*** 0.00 (-0.658)*** (-1.06)*** -0.08 (-0.954)***
p value (F) 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.9 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 within 0.14 0.64 0.63 0.71 0.70 0.65
R2 between 0.11 0.14 0.41 0.39 0.10 0.35
R2: overall 0.13 0.39 0.52 0.54 0.42 0.48
N 276 276 292 292 212 356
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow—CF, market-to-book ratio-
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow—CF*Neg (where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when cash
flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term—LBL and short-term—SBL bank loans, other long-term—OLL
and short-term liabilities—OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings—BH, ownership concentration
dummies from 1 to 5—OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed
capital at the beginning of the year—K(t - 1)
* Coefficient significant at 10 % or better
** Coefficient significant at 5 % or better
*** Coefficient significant at 1 % or better
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without bank board representation, because the former were less financially
constrained than the latter.
The two set of firms differ significantly as far as the level of bank financing, both
long-term and short-term, is concerned. The estimated coefficient of the variable
indicating long-term bank loans was twice as large for firms with a banker on the
board than for firms without bank representatives on the board. In case of short-term
bank loans estimated coefficient was five times larger for firms with a banker on the
board than for firms without bankers on the board. It suggests that bank financing
was far more important for firms with a banker on the board than for firms without
bank board representation.
In addition, the results reveal that for firms with a banker on the board the
coefficients of both long-term and short-term bank loans were nearly five times
larger than coefficient of cash flow. For those firms bank loans were more important
for investment financing than internal capital. In contrast, for firms with no bank
representatives on the board estimated coefficient of cash flow was twice as large as
estimated coefficient of short-term bank loans. Thus, for this set of firms internal
capital was more significant than short-term bank loans for investment financing.
Estimated coefficient of long-term bank loans was larger than estimated coefficient
of cash flow. Given that more than 50 % of the firms did not receive long-term bank
loans those results support the hypothesis that they were more financially
constrained (see Table 2). Consistent with previous studies, it appears that bankers
are on the board to supply debt market expertise. Booth and Deli (1999) present the
findings that the presence of bankers on the board is positively related to both short
and long-term bank debt. Dittmann et al. (2009) confirm that bankers while sitting
on firm’s board provide capital market expertise and thus help these firms to
overcome financial constraints.
The relation between investment spending and the level of investment
opportunities—measured by the market-to-book ratio—was positive and statically
significant just for firms without bank representatives on the board. They were
smaller—as the summary statistics show—than firms with bankers on the board and
therefore were likely to have bigger incentives to invest and grow.
For both sets of firms the estimated coefficient indicating other short-term
liabilities was statistically significant, but its impact on investment spending was
much smaller than bank loans. As far as other long-term liabilities are concerned
their increase was related to a rise in investment expenditures, but just for firms with
a banker on the board. Other creditors may treat bank board representation as a
mechanism that can assure themselves debt repayments. It is consistent with the
results that bankers on the boards provide certification for other creditors (Byrd and
Mizruchi 2005).
Production that may lead to increase capacity appeared to influence investment
spending of firms with a banker on the board. However, it had very minor impact as
the estimated coefficient of income from sales was negative, but very close to zero.
Ownership concentration was not statistically significant variable except from
firms with a banker on the board and with 75 % shares concentrated in hands of two
or three shareholders. In that case investment expenditures were negatively related
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to ownership concentration. It may indicate that the largest investors undertook a
firm restructuring. However, assets stripping hypothesis cannot be rejected.
A variable that indicates bank equity holding was included to the investment
equation, because the role of bank as shareholder may be important for firm
investment decisions. The effect of this variable was insignificant for firms that had
a bank representative on the board. On the other hand, for firms without bankers on
the board bank equity holding was positively and significantly related to investment
expenditures.
Last, but not least, investment expenditures were very much sensitive to macro
environment. From the data we see that the economic downturn from 2000 to 2002
had a negative impact on investment activities. Firms with a banker on the boards
reacted quickly on a decline of economic growth by decreasing of the amount spent
on investment. Macro situation had no impact on investment of firms without
bankers on the board. It shows that bankers may play important certification role on
firm’s board.
To investigate whether placement of a banker on the board indicates bank
monitoring I repeated estimation, classifying firms into two sub-sample differently.
First group (BCT) consisted of firms with a lender representative on the board at
least once during the research period 1999–2002. Second group (NBCT) included
firms without presence of bank-creditor on the board.
Table 2 (fifth and sixth columns) demonstrates that investment of firms with
bank-creditor representatives on the board was almost as sensitive to cash flow as
investment of firms without the presence of bank-creditor on the board. The
difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity between two distinguished sub-
samples appeared to be very small. Firms with affiliated bankers on the board faced
similar financial constraints in their investment decisions as firms with unaffiliated
bankers on the board.
Consistent with previous research I do not find evidence that bankers on the
boards of other firms are not primarily as monitors. Booth and Deli (1999) finds that
the presence of bankers on the board is positively related to short-term, long, term
and total bank debt, however the presence of bankers that have business relationship
with the firm is not linked to the bank borrowing. Thus, the results suggest that
bankers on the board supply financial expertise to firms, they do not sit on boards to
monitor debtors. Dittmann et al. (2009) suggest that bankers do not join the board to
monitor debtors and they do not tend to change their behaviour. Byrd and Mizruchi
(2005) complement those findings by showing that the presence of bank-lenders on
the board may not be solely explained by information asymmetries, but may be a
compound function of information asymmetries and the threat of firm’s financial
distress.
5 Controlling for possible selection bias
To control for selectivity bias that can arise at the firm level, I use the fixed effects
estimation that takes care of the selection bias related to non-random exit from the
sample. However, selectivity bias might not be related to firm’s identity
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characteristics. It may occur in the choice of a measure of bank monitoring, and then
explains the difference in the investment-cash-flow sensitivity between firms with a
banker on the boards and firms without bank board representation. To cope with the
problem I use, like in previous papers, the method described by Dubin and
McFadden (1984). It involves first estimating logit model on the choice of a banker
on the board, and then using the predicted probability from the logit model as an
exogenous variable in the investment equation.
Table 3 (1st column) presents the outcome of logit regressions. The relation
between a dummy variable representing the presence of a banker on the board and
the following independent variables: cash flow, firm’s size, dummy for bank equity
holdings, ownership concentration and short-term bank loans as well as other long-
term liabilities is significant.
Negative estimated coefficient of cash flow indicates that the lower level of cash
flow, the higher the probability of having a banker on the board. In other words, in
Poland bank representatives sit on the board of those firms that are likely to be in
financial distress. Hoshi et al. (1990) conclude that based on example of Japan the
costs of financial distress are lower for firms with close bank relationship. In
contrast, in the US bankers are less likely to be on the board of firms that could
Table 3 Logit estimates: firm characteristics associated with having a banker on the board (1st column)
















The dependent variable takes the value 1, when firms have bank representatives on firm supervisory
board, otherwise 0. The independent variables encompass: fixed capital investment I, cash flow—CF,
market-to-book ratio- Q, income from sales, long-term—LBL and short-term—SBL bank loans, other
long-term—OLL and short-term liabilities—OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings—BH, ownership
concentration dummies from 1 to 5 – OC. All the level variables are normalized by fixed capital at the
beginning of the year—K(t - 1). Lev is relation between the bank loans and all liabilities
* Coefficient significant at 10 % or better
** Coefficient significant at 5 % or better
*** Coefficient significant at 1 % or better
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benefit most from active bank monitoring and they do not join a firm’s board during
distress consistent with an important role for lender liability and potential conflicts.
The role of bankers on the board is very much dependent on the regulatory regime
(Kroszner and Strahan 2001).
Also, the value of estimated coefficient of size of firm is negative. It means that
probability of a banker’s appointment to the board increases with the size of firm.
Additionally, the presence of a banker is determined by the possibility of voting
itself into board, as direct bank shareholding is highly significant. Besides, the more
concentrated ownership, the higher probability of having bank board representation.
It implies the conflict of interests between a large shareholder and a creditor. Banks
may be afraid that large shareholder can undertake more risky project as it was
agreed upon in the credit contract. The higher risk, the higher return on investment
for shareholders. Creditors receive fixed return on their investment.
Short-term bank loans and long-term other liabilities predict positively for a firm
to have a banker on the board. One interpretation is that bankers sit on the
supervisory board of those firms that finance their activities with short-term credit.
Also, banks tend to have their representatives on the board to oversee whether other
creditors do not intend to satisfy their claims at their cost.
In contrast, investment expenditures, level of production and future profitability
of firm’s investment do not offer positive predictions of bank board representation.
It means that banks do not sit on the board of those firms that grow faster or have
better investment perspectives.
At the second stage of Dubina and McFaddena’s test I examine whether the
characteristics, that predict bank’s board representation, are related to investment
expenditures. I estimate the investment equation for two sets of firms using random
effects model that includes predicted probabilities of the presence of a banker on the
board as an exogenous variable. The coefficient of the additional variable measures
the correlation between unobserved firm effects and unobserved factors that affect
likelihood of having a banker on the board. Hence, it indicates the significance and
size of selectivity bias.
The outcome of random effect regression for firms with a banker on the board
(see Table 4, column 1) shows that effect of selectivity bias on investment-cash flow
sensitivity is limited. The coefficient on the selectivity term is not statistically
significant. As far as firms without bank’s board representation are concerned, the
additional variable (the predicted probability from the logit model) has significant
influence on the investment expenditures. After including this variable investment-
cash flow sensitivity has increased. Hence, selectivity bias causes underestimation
of investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms without bankers on the board.
I also use the Dubin and McFadden test to control for selectivity bias when bank
monitoring is measured by the close relationship with lending bank through board
representation. Results of logit regression (Table 4) demonstrate that relation
between the presence of bank-creditor on the board and the following independent
variables: cash flow, firm’s size, dummy for bank equity holdings, short-term bank
loans as well as other long-term liabilities is significant. Note that the same variables
decide about the presence of a banker on the board.
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Results of random effects regression for firms with a banker from lending bank
on the board (Table 4, column 2) show that relation between additional variable and
investment expenditures is not statistically significant. Hence, selectivity bias does
not influence investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, for firms without bank-
Table 4 Random effects estimates of the investment equation for firms with a banker on the board (BT)
and for firms without bankers on the board (NBT) as well as for firms with a bank-creditor representative
on the board (BCT) and for firms without bankers from lending bank on the board (NBCT)
BT NBT BCT NBCT
1 2 3 4
CF/Kt-1 0.10 1.6*** 0.53* 0.75***
Q -0.04 0.286*** -0.02 0.314***
S/Kt-1 (-0.049)*** (-0.03)*** (-0.049)*** -0.01
CF/Kt-1*Neg -0.15 -0.55 -0.25 -1.11
LBL/Kt-1 0.87*** 0.3* 0.86*** 0.49***
SBL/Kt-1 1.304*** (-0.378)*** 1.22*** 0.11
OLL/Kt-1 0.585** (-0.93)*** 0.39 -0.13
OSL/Kt-1 0.105* 0.222*** 0.117* 0.122***
BH 0.38 (-1.41)*** -0.02 -0.14
CO_1 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05
CO_2 (-0.476)** -0.22 (-0.62)** 0.07
CO_3 -0.10 (-0.55)*** (-0.33)* 0.00
CO_4 -0.06 (-0.66)*** -0.27 -0.04
CO_5 NA -0.76 NA 0.07
T2 (-0.291)*** 0.00 (-0.313)*** -0.02
T3 (-0.484)*** -0.09 (-0.5)*** -0.15
T4 (-0.47)*** -0.10 (-0.53)*** (-0.12)*
The predicted probability
from the logit model
1.66 (-5.7)*** 0.11 (-0.588)*
Constant -0.77 (-2.3)*** 0.25 (-0.59)***
p value (F) 0.00 0.00 0 0.00
R2 within 0.60 0.73 0.67 0.64
R2 between 0.21 0.50 17 0.40
R2: overall 0.43 0.64 0.46 0.52
N 276 292 212 356
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow—CF, market-to-book ratio-
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow—CF*Neg (where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when cash
flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term—LBL and short-term—SBL bank loans, other long-term—OLL
and short-term liabilities—OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings—BH, ownership concentration
dummies from 1 to 5—OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed
capital at the beginning of the year—K(t - 1)
* Coefficient significant at 10 % or better
** Coefficient significant at 5 % or better
*** Coefficient significant at 1 % or better
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creditor’s representatives on the boards investment spending is positively and
significantly related to the predicted probability of additional variable from logit
regression. After including the additional variable to equation investment-cash flow
sensitivity increased. Thus, selectivity bias causes underestimation of investment-
cash flow sensitivity for firms without bank-creditor board representation. Based on
the results from Dubin and McFadden’s test bankers on the board is an adequate
measure of bank monitoring.
6 Conclusions
On the threshold of the transition process from a centrally planned to a market
economy in the Central and Eastern Europe banks were to play a dominant role in
corporate governance given the underdeveloped equity market and the existing,
under a socialist regime, close relationship between lenders and state enterprises.
However, due to overwhelming problems with bad debts and on-going bank’s
privatization in 90s, there were hardly any evidence that banks got involved in
active debtor’s monitoring through firm’s board representation.
After more than a decade of transition reforms the research outcome shows that
bank credits have an important role in firm’s financing. Firms with a bank-creditor
representative on the board rely more heavily on bank loans than on internal capital
while making investment decisions. In contrast, firms without a bank-creditor
representative on the board finance to a larger extent their investment with internal
capital than bank loans. Bank loans are also more important source of financing for
firms with a banker on the board than for firms without the bank board
representation.
However, the empirical results also demonstrate that firms with a bank-creditor
representative on the board are as much financially constrained in their investment
behaviour than firms without the presence of a bank-creditor on the board. Thus, the
study yields the conclusion that bankers on the boards of Polish firms do not
perform monitoring function as lenders. They rather use their placement in order to
promote bank’s business by granting more credits to firms, where they sit on the
supervisory board. The findings show that investment of firms with a banker on the
board is less sensitive to cash flow than investment of firms without bank
representatives on the board. The result suggests that bankers on the board provide
financial expertise that help those firm to reduce financial constraints.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix
See Tables 5, 6 and 7
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Table 5 Definition and description of all variables used in the paper
Variable Definition of variable Description
Iit Investment spending in fix
assets of the ith firm in t
time
Investment is an explained variable and is
calculated as the first difference of gross
fixed assets expenditures. Fixed assets
include land, property, plant, equipment
and patents
Qit Tobin Q of the ith firm in t
time
Tobin Q is an explanatory variable
represents future growth investment
opportunities, which is proxied by market-
to-book ratio
CFit Cash flow of the ith firm in t
time
Cash flow is an explanatory variable
measured as net income plus non-cash
costs (e.g. depreciation) minus non cash
expenditure
CF*Negit Negative cash flow of the ith
firm in t time
Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when
cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise
Ki(t - 1) Stock of fixed assets at the
beginning of the period t
To avoid heteroskedasticity all variables in
the model are normalized by the stock of
fixed assets at the beginning of the period t
Sit Revenue from sales of the ith
firm in t time
Revenue from sales as the proxy for
production to control for a potential
accelerator effect. High level of production
may lead to increase capacity in the future,
hence more fix assets investment
expenditures are necessary
LBLit Long-term bank loans of the
ith firm in t time
The volume of long-term bank credits on
firm’s books
SBLit Short-term bank loans of the
ith firm in t time
The volume of short-term bank credits on
firm’s books
OLLit Other long-term liabilities of
the ith firm in t time
The volume of other long-term liabilities on
firm’s books
OSLit Other short-term liabilities of
the ith firm in t time
The volume of other short-term bank credits
on firm’s books
BHit Bank’s equity holding of the
ith firm in t time
A dummy variable that equals 1, if there is at
least one bank among firm’s shareholders,
0 otherwise
OCit Concentration of firm
ownership structure of the
ith firm in t time
The variable takes values from 1—the most
concentrated firm ownership structure to
do 5—the lowest level of concentration.
When the variable OC is set as 1 then it
means that single shareholder holds more
than 75 %. If two or three shareholders
hold more than 75 % than the variable is
equal 2. Concentration is set as 3 when the
single shareholder holds more 50 % and
relatively 4 if two or three shareholders
hold more than 50 %. Concentration is
considered to be 5 in all the cases in which
the concentration is more dispersed than
50 %
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